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NOTES
Effects of the New Illinois Criminal Code on
Prosecutions for Inchoate Crimes
[I] n the field of penal law above all others-since that is the law
to which people look for the protection of their deepest interests,
and where inadequacies and arbitrariness can be most destructive
of those interests-periodical, systematic, critical re-examination
and revision is of utmost importance to every community as a
matter of affirmative overall policy.'
The Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 is the fourth attempt in recent
years to codify substantive criminal law in systematic fashion. Codes
in Louisiana and Wisconsin and the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code preceded the Illinois Code and were, in varying degrees,
relied on by its drafters. The purpose of this note is to compare, sec-
tion by section,2 the provisions of the Illinois Code that define inchoate
offenses-solicitation, conspiracy and attempt-with the parallel pro-
visions of the Louisiana, Wisconsin and Model Penal Codes. Because
inchoate offenses consist of acts performed only in anticipation of
further criminal conduct, some unusual problems of definition arise.
The first is that underlying philosophical attitudes about the degree of
culpability that conduct should evince to be called criminal vary
considerably. The second is that limitations on the capacity of words
to convey precise ideas make describing how close the conduct must
come to accomplishing its goal difficult. Finally the first two problems
must be resolved in the light of police demands for weapons ap-
propriate to prevent the commission of crime instead of merely to
apprehend violators after they commit substantive offenses. Par-
ticular attention will be paid to the ways in which these problems have
been resolved.
1. Letter from Professor George H. Dession to Hon. Jose Trias Monge, Mar.
28, 1953, on file in the Yale Law Library, as quoted in 71 YALE L.J. 1050 (1962).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 8-1 to -6 (1961). § 8-1 (Solicitation); § 8-2
(Conspiracy); § 8-3 (Defense); § 8-4 (Attempt); § 8-5 (Multiple Convictions).
§ 8-6 provides this definition of "offense":
For the purposes of this Article, "offense" shall include conduct which if
performed in another State would be criminal by the laws of that State and
which conduct if performed in this State would be an offense under the laws
of this State.
This provision makes it clear that a conspiracy, for example, in Illinois to perform
acts in another state may be punished in Illinois if the intended acts constitute
punishable acts in both Illinois and the other states. § 1-5 of the Code confers
jurisdiction to prosecute the inchoate crime in Illinois in such an instance.
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Rationale
Intentional conduct which causes direct injury to a person or thing
should ordinarily be classified as criminal and hence punishable. But
difficulties arise in the case of inchoate offenses, which do not neces-
sarily cause harm. The determination that such conduct is so socially
harmful as to be punishable was a product of years of legal evolution,
during which consideration was given to the relative weight of free-
dom of individual conduct as compared with the need for effective
crime prevention. Today, inchoate offenses are clearly recognized as
a proper subject of criminal legislation.3
The usual rationale for punishment of criminal conduct is, for the
most part, based on the deterrent effect punishment will have upon
future conduct.4 The reasoning of the drafters of the Model Penal
Code is that the deterrence rationale is not readily applicable to incho-
ate offenses. As they necessarily involve intentions to commit a sub-
stantive offense, punishment of the inchoate offense could scarcely add
to the deterrent effect of punishment for the substantive crime.5 If
that reasoning is correct, other bases must be found for the inclusion
of inchoate offenses in a criminal code. It is immediately apparent
that the conduct inherent in solicitation, conspiracy and attempt
demonstrates an intention to perform further proscribed acts, that
punishment of the inchoate offense is warranted by the necessity of
enabling law enforcement officials to intervene at that point and so
prevent the consummation of the intended crime. Moreover, by
contemporary standards it would be absurd to suggest that actual
harm is needed before police may intervene and almost as absurd to
allow exculpation if the accused fortuitously failed to complete his
intended crime,6 whether due to his own failing (as when the bullet
misses the intended victim), or the failure of a party consorted with
(as when the person solicited fails to perform the requested crime),
or the conduct of a third party when one intervenes.
Also worthy of consideration is the fact that the inchoate conduct
suggests that the actor would be disposed toward criminal activities
on other occasions, thus presenting a special danger calling for treat-
ment.7
3. See generally PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 476, 506-07, 528 (1957) and authori-
ties cited therein.
4. See ZILBooRG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT
(1954), especially pp. 27-33.
5. MODEL PENAL CODE, Art. 5, comment at 24 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
6. Id. at 25.
7. Ibid.
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Solicitation
It has been suggested that solicitation should not be an offense
because the solicitor is not socially dangerous until the substantive
crime is committed, resulting then in the imposition of liability upon
the solicitor as an accomplice.8 But such thinking misses the purpose
of the inchoate offense. A comment to the Model Penal Code sets out
this rationale:
Purposeful solicitation presents dangers calling for preventive
intervention and is sufficiently indicative of a disposition towards
criminal activity to call for liability. Moreover, the fortuity that
the person solicited does not agree to commit the incited crime
plainly should not relieve the solicitor of liability, when otherwise
he would be a conspirator or an accomplice.0
Apparently recognizing the soundness of such reasoning, the Illinois
legislature included a solicitation provision in the new code.
Before enactment of the new code, solicitation was not a statutory
offense in Illinois, but it had early been recognized as a common law
offense. 10 In Cox v. Peoplel" the court both limited the offense to
solicitation of conduct which might cause a breach of the peace, and
also held that a mere solicitation could not be punished as an at-
tempt.12 However, in spite of this early limitation to conduct causing
a breach of the peace, and in spite of the limitation of the offense in
the other two recent codes to solicitations of a felony,13 the Illinois
Code follows the Model Penal Code14 in imposing penalties for solicita-
tions of any statutory offense. This blanket coverage seems pref-
erable, for it is hard to conceive a reason, in principle, why one should
be allowed to solicit the commission of any crime, regardless of how
"trivial" it may appear to be.'5
In section 8-3 the Code provides that it is a defense to a charge of
solicitation "that if the criminal object were achieved the accused
[solicitor] would not be guilty of an offense."'e This defense is ap-
plicable to those persons whom the legislature has relieved of liability
8. Comment, Proposed Revisions in the Illinois Criminal Code, 48 Nw. U.L.
REV. 198, 211 (1953).
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02, comment at 82 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
10. Walsh v. People, 65 Ill. 58 (1872).
11. 82 Ill. 191 (1876).
12. It appears from the report of the case that the defendant solicited a relative
to commit incest. According to PERKINS, CRImINAL LAW 510 (1957), a solicitation
of immediate action requiring the cooperation or submission of the party solicited
might be regarded and punished as an attempt.
13. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27 (1950); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.30 (1957).
14. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
15. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02, comment at 83-86 (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1960).
16. Accord, MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
(Emphasis added.)
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because of some incapacity or particular position, for example where
the party is underage or is a victim of an abortion." But it should be
noted that, by the principle of exclusion, it is no defense to a charge
of solicitation that the party solicited is immune from prosecution for
the substantive offense, because of some incapacity or some legisla-
tive policy.-
In accordance with the general common law rule,' 9 section 8-5 of
the Code provides that a defendant cannot be convicted of both
solicitation and the substantive crime. But the merger is not total.
The defendant may still be charged with and prosecuted for both
solicitation and the intended crime, but he may be convicted of only
one of the two charges.20 This rule will be an aid to prosecutors when
it is clear at the start of the trial that the defendant did solicit an
offense, but some doubt remains whether the offense was in fact com-
mitted. And it seems logical that the fact that there is a reasonable
doubt concerning the commission of the substantive offense should be
no bar to a conviction for a clear infraction of the inchoate provision.
Conspiracy
The theory upon which conspiracy prosecutions have rested has
been that such a greater danger of success of the criminal goal is
created by the plurality of actors that punishment of the initial or-
ganization is warranted.21 This premise is supported by such con-
siderations as that it would be more difficult for an individual within
the group to withdraw from the criminal objective, and that the
division of labor increases the efficiency of the scheme and thus the
likelihood of its success, which seem especially pertinent to the
present-day need for combating organized crime.
There seems to be a recent trend toward bringing the rationale of
17. ILL. REV. CRIM. CODE of 1961, at 207 (Tent. Final Draft 1960). In other
words, by statute in most states a woman who is the victim of an abortion cannot
be convicted of the crime of abortion, and for that reason she likewise cannot
be convicted of soliciting an abortion. Similarly, if a minor, because of his age,
cannot be convicted of a substantive offense, he cannot be convicted of soliciting
that offense.
18. Ibid. Under the Model Penal Code a solicitation is punishable if the
solicitor believes that either he or the party solicited has the necessary capacity
to commit the crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04(1) (a) (Proposed Official Draft
1962). "This rule accords with the general principle in the Draft provisions
governing inchoate crimes that the defendant's culpability is to be measured by
the circumstances as he believes them to be." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04(1) (a),
comment at 171 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
19. See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 507 (1957).
20. ILL. REV. CRIM. CODE of 1961, at 213 (Tent. Final Draft 1960).
21. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 535 (1957).
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conspiracy closer to that of attempt, in that it is used as a means of
dealing with crimes in their incipiency after there has been an un-
ambiguous manifestation of intent.22 However, it is difficult to deter-
mine yet whether this will be only an additional rationale or will
entirely replace the traditional rationale of greater risk by plurality.
In an attempt, intent is evidenced by the overt conduct of the actor,
whereas in a conspiracy, it is manifested by the agreement and plan-
ning and, as required by the more recent codes, some preparatory
overt act.
The old Illinois Criminal Code contained three separate provisions
for the crime of conspiracy: Section 138, Conspiracy to indict; Sec-
tion 139, Conspiracy to do illegal act; Section 140, Conspiracy against
the state.2 3 Most of the cases arose under Section 139, which, it was
held,24 did not abrogate, but rather included, the common law offense
of conspiracy. Hence, in accordance with the common law definition
of conspiracy, one could be punished for conspiring to commit an act
which was not in violation of any statute, but one which was merely
"unlawful. ' 25 This vague definition was criticized by several writers
for its failure to inform the accused of the nature of his alleged
offense.26 In section 8-2 (a) the drafters of the new Illinois Code
limited the scope of this inchoate crime, as was done earlier in the
Wisconsin, '27 Louisiana 28 and Model Penal Codes, 9 to conspiracies to
commit criminal offenses:
Consistent with the abolition by the Code of common law crimes
(§1-3), and the general policy throughout the Code of eliminating
from criminal sanctions strictly tortious or private wrongs for
which adequate redress is available in civil actions, the Commit-
tee decided in favor of restricting conspiracy to agreements to
commit "an offense," which, by definition in Section 2-12 means a
violation of any penal statute of this State.30
Another change made by section 8-2 (a) is the requirement of an
22. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03, comment at 96-97 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
23. 3 Statutes of Ill. 124 (Gross 1874) (conspiracy to indict) ; Ill. Laws 1947 at
799 (conspiracy to do illegal act); Ill. Laws 1919 at 426 (conspiracy against the
state).
24. People v. Tilton, 357 Ill. 47, 191 N.E. 257 (1934); People v. Roth, 22 Ill.
App. 2d 8, 159 N.E.2d 51 (1959).
25. People v. Tilton, supra note 24.
26. 28 ILL. BJ. 211; Comment, supra note 8, at 206-07.
27. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.31 (1957).
28. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:26 (1950).
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The drafters,
however, acknowledged the fact that some conduct, otherwise not criminal, might
become so if engaged in by a group, but they recommended that such situations
be dealt with by the legislature in separate sections as deemed necessary. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.03(1), comment at 103-04 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
30. ILL. REv. CRI . CODE of 1961, at 207-08 (Tent. Final Draft 1960).
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overt act.3 1 As pointed out by the drafters,32 this change may be more
formal than substantive since no prior cases have been found in which
the agreement alone constituted the evidence of conspiracy. There
has been some debate whether the required overt act is only a neces-
sary bit of evidence or is an element of the offense itself. The Supreme
Court has held, with a dissent by Holmes, J., that it is the latter.3 3 This
problem is not as academic as it may appear at first glance, for upon
its answer may depend such matters as venue, jurisdiction and
statute of limitations.3' At any rate, the nature of the overt act need
be only that of preparation as opposed to an actual attempt.3 5
Section 8-2 (b) prohibits the use of certain enumerated defenses to
a charge of conspiracy. This section contains probably the most
radical and controversial changes to be found in this part of the Code:
It shall not be a defense to conspiracy that the person or
persons with whom the accused is alleged to have conspired:
(1) Has not been prosecuted or convicted, ...
The drafters stated that this subsection is "merely a codification of
the existing law in Illinois," 36 probably relying both upon the case of
People v. Dewey,3 7 in which the court held that a "judgment of con-
viction may be pronounced against one [conspirator] before the trial
of the others," 38 and upon the general law of most states.39 The Dewey
case held that the disposition of the conspiracy charge as to other
named conspirators was immaterial since the indictment had charged
the defendant with having conspired with "divers other persons whose
names are to the said Grand Jurors unknown," 40 and that under such
an indictment, one person may be found guilty of conspiracy.4' In so
holding, the court rejected Casper v. State,42 a Wisconsin case which
held that upon separate trials of co-conspirators a court may not
proceed to final judgment, but rather must only allow the finding of
31. No overt act was required under the general conspiracy provision of the
old code. People v. Drury, 335 Ill. 539, 167 N.E. 823 (1929). But the provision
concerning conspiracies against the state did require an "act to effect the object."
Ill. Laws 1919, at 426.
32. ILL. REv. CRiM. CODE of 1961, at 208 (Tent. Final Draft 1960).
33. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
34. PERaINS, CRIMINAL LAW 532 (1957).
35. Id. at 533.
36. ILL. REV. CRIM. CODE of 1961, at 209 (Tent. Final Draft 1960).
37. 259 Ill. App. 330 (1930).
38. Id. at 334.
39. See Kleihege v. State, 206 Ind. 206, 177 N.E. 60, superseded, 188 N.E. 786
(1931), and People v. Richards, 67 Cal. 412, 7 Pac. 828 (1885).
40. People v. Dewey, 259 Ill. App. 330, 332 (1930).
41. Id. at 334.
42. 47 Wis. 535, 2 N.W. 1117 (1879).
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guilty to stand pending the subsequent trial and a similar finding as
to the other accused. However, nine years later, another Illinois
Appellate Court, in People v. Levy,43 explicitly followed the rule in
Casper without mentioning Dewey. The most recent case on this
point" added to the confusion by failing to refer to the Levy case and
citing not only Dewey, but also People v. Bryant,45 which held that
"before a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy the evidence in the
cause on trial must show that there were two or more persons guilty
of such conspiracy." 46 So, although section 8-2 (b) (1) may not neces-
sarily change the Illinois law regarding the conviction of one con-
spirator before trial of the other (s), it will certainly clarify it.
(2) Has been convicted of a different offense, ...
This subsection merely codifies earlier Illinois law 7 The conviction
of the other conspirator of a more substantive offense based on evi-
dence peculiar to his trial, should be no bar to a showing of his guilt of
the conspiracy for the purpose of convicting the accused.
(3) Is not amenable to jstice,...
This rule, having apparently been established in Illinois for quite
some time,48 is the result of the fact that evidence of the conspiracy
is often almost inaccessible without the information or testimony of
one of the conspirators. In order to obtain such testimony it is a
common practice to grant the witness immunity from prosecution. As
explained in People v. Bryant,4
The propriety of granting immunity in such cases arises out of
the fact that by candidly and fully disclosing the circumstances
attending the transaction such defendant has not only revealed
the guilt of his accomplice but has also acknowledged his own
guilt of the crime charged. The effect of granting immunity to
such defendant is not to exculpate or acquit him of guilt but to
remit the punishment which would otherwise follow his dis-
closures at the trial.5 0
Regardless of whether one approves of such rationale, the fact re-
mains that the practice of granting such immunity is widely thought
to be necessary.
43. 299 Ill. App. 453, 20 N.E.2d 171 (1939).
44. People v. Estep, 346 II. App. 132, 104 N.E.2d 562 (1952).
45. 409 I1. 467, 100 N.E.2d 598 (1951).
46. Id. at 469, 100 N.E.2d at 600. (Emphasis added.)
47. ILL. REv. CRal. CODE of 1961, at 209 (Tent. Final Draft 1960).
48. See People v. Bryant, 409 Ill. 467, 100 N.E.2d 598 (1951) and People v.
Dewey, 259 Ill. App. 330 (1930). Accord, MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04 (1) (b) (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962).
49. 409 Ill. 467, 100 N.E.2d 598 (1951).
50. Id. at 471, 100 N.E.2d at 601.
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This section would also seem to include instances in which the
accused's co-conspirator has fled the jurisdiction or has died before
prosecution.
(4) Has been acquitted, ...
Prior to enactment of the new code, Illinois had followed the almost
universally accepted rule that an acquittal on the conspiracy charge
of one of two conspirators precluded a conviction of the other."' The
obvious basis of this rule was that the crime of conspiracy, by defini-
tion, requires two or more guilty parties, as one can not conspire with
himself.52 In reversing the prior rule, the new code is in accord with
the general treatment given by the Model Penal Code.53 But the
drafters of the latter took no position with respect to the problems
of an inconsistent verdict in a joint trial and the admissibility of a
judgment of acquittal in a subsequent trial of a co-conspirator. 54 The
new Illinois Code, however, would seem to permit the conviction of one
of two conspirators in a joint trial and the acquittal of the other. This
result hardly seems congruous with the nature of the crime of con-
spiracy. Furthermore, the reasons given by the drafters for abrogat-
ing the defense of acquittal, as expressed in the following passage,
are not applicable to joint trials:
However, this rationale [the necessity of two guilty parties] is
rejected as being too technical and overlooking the realities of
trials which involve differences in juries, contingent availability
of witnesses, the varying ability of different prosecutors and
defense attorneys, etc. The defendant obtains a full and fair
trial; what happened to another defendant at another time and
place in another trial before a different judge and jury should
not be a bar to trial here.55
51. People v. Bryant, 409 Ill. 467, 100 N.E.2d 598 (1951). See People v.
Estep, 346 Ill. App. 132, 104 N.E.2d 562 (1952), in which the court acknowl-
edged the rule but avoided the question of whether a husband and wife were to be
legally regarded as one or two persons for purposes of a conspiracy charge,
since, in the particular case, the indictment had included others "unknown" in the
conspiracy count.
52. See United States v. Santa Rita Store Co., 16 N.M. 3, 113 Pac. 620 (1911),
in which the court held that two corporations cannot be guilty of a conspiracy
because of the activities of only one man, even though he was duly authorized
to act as the agent of both.
53. Section 5.03, comment 105-06 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). The Model
Penal Code has no specific section which negates acquittal as a defense; instead,
the drafters state that this defense is abrogated by the Code's definition of con-
spiracy, which excludes the usual requirement of "two or more," regarding only
individual culpability. Id. at 104.
But the Wisconsin legislature, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.31 (1957), apparently
did not change the rule in that state that an acquittal of all conspirators except
the accused necessitates an acquittal of the accused. Casper v. State, 47 Wis.
1117 (1879).
54. Mon EL PENAL CODE § 5.03, comment at 106 (Tent. Draft. No. 10, 1960).
55. ILL. Rav. CRIM. CODE of 1961, at 209 (Tent. Final Draft 1960).
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Even if this section should be construed to apply only to separate,
and not to joint, trials, however, the quoted comment of the drafters
might still disturb those who adhere to the theory that justice should
not vary according to the time, place, judge, jury, or ability of the
opposing attorneys. On the other hand, it has been said that, as a
result of requiring a reversal of a prior finding of guilt because of a
subsequent acquittal in a separate trial of a co-conspirator, the first
accused is allowed the benefit of two trials; the verdict of the second
jury prevails over that of the first; the prosecutor must, in effect,
prove his case to twenty-four jurors; and during the process much
time and money are expended 6 However, by definition, a conspiracy
must still consist of at least two parties, and acquittal of one of them
can mean nothing less, to defense attorneys at least, than that the
convicted defendant has conspired with himself.
(5) Lacked the capacity to commit the offense.
As stated by the drafters,57 this subsection is in accord with the
general rule that a defendant is denied defenses which are available
to his accomplice because of some trait or position peculiar to the
latter.5 8 With regard to conspiracy and the defense of acquittal,
however, this rule, in conjunction with subsection (4), may alter
prior Illinois law in that it will enable the conviction of one con-
spirator to stand even though his only co-conspirator has been ac-
quitted because of some legal incapacity.
The sections discussed above have enumerated those matters which
are not defenses to a charge of conspiracy. Section 8-3 provides that
it is a defense to the charge of conspiracy that the accused would not
be guilty of the substantive offense if it were achieved. 0 However,
the fact that the accused lacks the capacity to commit the substantive
offense by himself does not necessarily bring him within the protection
of this defense.
For example, a layman lacks the capacity to commit barratry, but
if he and an attorney plan a course of action which leads to the com-
mission of barratry by the latter, the layman can be convicted of
that substantive offense as an accomplice. Thus, in any case when
one member of a conspiracy has the capacity to commit the substan-
tive offense no other member who could be convicted thereof as an
accomplice can avail himself of the section 8-3 defense.60
56. Note, 37 ILL. L. REv. 370, 371 (1943).
57. ILL. REV. CRIMi. CODE of 1961, at 209 (Tent. Final Draft 1960).
58. People v. Armstrong, 299 fI1. 349, 132 N.E. 547 (1921).
59. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04 (2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
60. See id. at § 5.04(1) (b). Under present Illinois law a person who would be
a principal in the second degree or an accessory before the fact at common law is
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As pointed out by the Model Penal Code, that it is a defense that
the accused would not be guilty of the substantive crime is intended
primarily to cover two circumstances.61 The first is the situation in
which the accused is the victim of a second party,62 for example, the
parent who pays ransom to a kidnapper. To hold the victim of a
crime guilty of conspiring to commit it would confound legislative
purpose.6 3 The second instance is that in which "the behavior of more
than one person is 'inevitably incident'" to the commission of the
substantive offense.' It becomes necessary here to consider the so-
called "Wharton rule."
This rule is usually stated in terms similar to the following: Where
a concert of agents is necessary to the commission of the substantive
offense, a charge of conspiracy against only those parties necessary
to that concert will not lie. The rationale given is that the essence of
the crime of conspiracy is the greater danger presented by a plurality
of agents, and since the danger of a crime to the commission of which
a plurality is necessary is not increased by the preliminary planning
of those necessary agents, such planning may not be punished as a
conspiracy. 5 In 1940 an Illinois Appellate Court followed this rule
in People v. Purcell,66 in which two defendants were indicted for con-
spiring to gamble by playing cards. One commentator lauded the
case, saying that to hold otherwise would erase the traditional dis-
tinctions between conspiracy and attempt.6 7 However, another ob-
server criticized the case, contending that where a concert of agents is
necessary to the commission of the substantive offense the conspiracy
becomes more like an attempt, so that the Wharton rule should only
apply where the offense has been consummated, so as to prevent
multiple conviction.6 8 The drafters of the Illinois code eliminated the
Wharton rule as a defense by defining conspiracy to include a con-
spiracy to commit any offense, saying that the Wharton rule "fails to
take into account the preventive aspect of prosecuting conspiracies. '6 9
The Model Penal Code has the same effect. The drafters of that code
reasoned that, because the accused's only defense to a conspiracy
now guilty as a principal in the first degree. See ILL. R-v. CRim. CODE of 1961, at
162 (Tent. Final Draft 1960).
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04(2), comment at 172-74 (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1960).
62. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(5), comment at 35-38 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1953).
63. Id. at 35.
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04(2), comment at 172 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
65. 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1604 (12th ed. 1932).
66. 304 Ill. App. 215, 26 N.E.2d 153 (1940).
67. 8 U. CHI. L. Rsv. 138 (1940).
68. 29 ILL. B.J. 185 (1941).
69. ILL. REV. CRIM. CODE of 1961, at 210 (Tent. Final Draft 1960).
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charge under the Model Code is that he would not be guilty of the
substantive offense, the Wharton defense is eliminated by implication,
and the fact that the substantive offense requires more than one party
for its commission will not excuse the accused of the conspiracy
charge if he would be guilty of the substantive offense.7 0 But if the
legislative intent in providing for punishment of the substantive
offense showed that only one of two necessary parties was to be guilty
thereof,71 as, for example, in abortion, the other party, whose conduct
is "inevitably incident" to the commission of the offense, may not be
convicted of a conspiracy.
Under section 8-5 a conspiracy defendant may now be convicted of
the conspiracy or of the substantive offense, but not of both. This
is an important change from prior Illinois law which, following the
rule of most states, held that the defendant could be convicted of both
charges72 for the reason that conspiracy, unlike attempt, was not a
lesser included offense, but rather was a separate offense punishable
in itself. The cases holding this view had apparently overruled such
earlier decisions as Hoyt v. People7 3 which followed the common law
rule that a conspiracy, as a misdemeanor, merged into a felonious
substantive offense. By eliminating defenses traditionally available
to conspiracy charges, the drafters have, to some extent, transformed
the basis of conspiracy from aggravation of danger by plurality to
something more akin to the prevention of crime in its incipiency, as
in the law of attempt. It seems wise, then, that the drafters have also
brought conspiracy (and solicitation) prosecutions into line with the
practice in attempt cases of avoiding multiple convictions.7'
Attempt
One apparent purpose of the inchoate offense of attempt is to
enable law enforcement officers to prevent the consummation of the
particular substantive offense. In determining how this purpose may
be best effectuated, two conflicting factors must be balanced: the need
of the community for effective crime prevention and the requirement
that criminal statutes be so drafted as to eliminate or at least
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04(2), comment at 173 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
71. See Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932).
72. People v. Moshiek, 346 Ill. 154, 178 N.E. 337 (1931); People v. Dorman,
347 Ill. App. 317, 106 N.E.2d 842 (1952).
73. 140 Ill. 588, 30 N.E. 315 (1892) (citing 2 WHARTON, PRECEDENTS OF IN-
DICTMENTS AND PLEAS 94-97 (3rd ed. 1871) as authority). But of. People v.
Poindexter, 243 Ill. 68, 90 N.E. 261 (1909) and Regent v. People, 96 Ill. App. 189
(1901), which holds that a conspiracy to commit a felony did not merge in the
completed felony where the felony was completed in another state.
74. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03, comment at 98-100 (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1960), which suggests that the conspiracy and substantive offense should "merge"
in some instances but not in others.
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minimize interference with innocent conduct. Imposition of sanctions
for attempts also provides a means for dealing with persons who thus
demonstrate a danger to society.15
The attempt provision (section 8-4) requires an intent to commit
an offense plus a substantial step toward that commission. This is a
change from the wording of the earlier statute which read, "Whoever
attempts to commit any offense ... and does any act towards it but
fails .... -76 Other modern codes have likewise searched for language
sufficiently explicit to give the courts a definite criterion by which
to determine just how far the defendant must proceed in order for his
conduct to constitute an attempt. Louisiana requires an intent plus
an act "tending directly toward the accomplishing" of the criminal
object,77 whereas Wisconsin demands that the act unequivocally
demonstrate the intent."8 The Model Penal Code7 9 requires both that
the act be a substantial step and that it be strongly corroborative of
the purpose, listing several factors to be used in determining such
corroboration."O Whether these different statutes have succeeded in
imposing more definite standards is the subject of some question.
Doubtful also is the likelihood that the new definition will change the
prior Illinois law of attempts. For example, in the recent case of
75. Id. at 25.
76. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1874, ch. 38, § 273, at 393. (Emphasis added.)
77. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:27 (1950).
78. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.32 (1957).
79. Section 5.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
80. The factors listed in MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) are as follows:
Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under Sub-
section (1) (c) of this Section unless it is strongly corroborative of the
actor's criminal purpose. Without negativing the sufficiency of other con-
duct, the following, if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose,
shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law:
(a) lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim
of the crime;
(b) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to
go to the place contemplated for its commission;(c) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the
crime;
(d) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which it is
contemplated that the crime will be committed;
(e) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the
crime, which are specially designed for such unlawful use or which can
serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances;
(f) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in
the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its com-
mission, where such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful
purpose of the actor under the circumstances;
(g) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an
element of the crime.
For a discussion of the various efforts at drawing a distinction between a mere
preparation and an attempt see MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (c), comment at
48-49 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
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People v. Woods,8' decided immediately after the new code went into
effect but based on common law attempt as codified in the old statute, "
the court used language identical to that of the new code in determin-
ing whether the conduct had gone far enough to be an attempt. The
drafters, merely trying to enact more understandable language, were
aware that it probably would not change the decisions in particular
cases. "Whether we describe the required act as a substantial step
toward commission, or as in dangerous proximity to the principal of-
fense, the courts must still make the determination based on the facts
of each case."83
Under the old Illinois Code, failure of the attempt was a necessary
element of that offense.84 This rule was based on the common law
idea of absolute merger of a misdemeanor into a felony.85 The new
code has, in line with the urgings of most modern writers," eliminated
failure as an element of the offense. However, section 8-5 does provide
that the defendant may not be convicted of both the attempt and the
substantive crime.
The general attempt section (8-4) is applicable to attempts to
commit all offenses, thus eliminating the need for the special attempt
provisions of the old code, such as attempted arson, attempted bribery
and attempted burglary.87
The area of the law of attempts which raises perhaps the most
complex problems is that concerning impossibility as a defense. Sec-
tion 8-4 (b) deals with the matter as follows:
It shall not be a defense to a charge of attempt that because of
a misapprehension of the circumstances it would have been im-
possible for the accused to commit the offense attempted.
The drafting committee simply states that, in accordance with the
general rule, this provision eliminates both factual and legal im-
possibility as a defense, leaving as the sole defense what they call
"inherent" impossibility 8 Prior Illinois law had refused to recognize
factual impossibility as a defense.8 9 But a New York case, People v.
81. 24 Ill. 2d 154, 180 N.E.2d 475 (1962).
82. Supra n. 67.
83. ILi. REV. Cnm . CODE of 1961, at 212 (Tent. Final Draft 1960).
84. See People v. Lardner, 300 Ill. 264, 266, 133 N.E. 375, 376 (1921): "A
failure to consummate the crime is as much an essential element of an attempt as
the intent and the performance of an overt act toward its consummation."
85. For a thorough discussion of this matter see PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW
477-81 (1957).
86. Id. at 477.
87. ILL. REV. CRIM. CODE of 1961, at 212-13 (Tent. Final Draft 1960).
88. Id. at 212 (citing witchcraft as an example of inherent impossibility).
89. See People v. Dogoda, 9 Ill. 2d 198, 137 N.E.2d 386 (1956) (not necessary
that store contain personal property for charge of attempted burglary), and
People v. Huff, 339 Ill. 328, 171 N.E. 261 (1930) (not necessary that victim of
abortion be pregnant for charge of attempted abortion). But of. People v.
Purcell, 269 Il. 467, 109 N.E. 1007 (1915), in which the court, while recognizing
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Jaffee,9 0 held that a legal impossibility (the fact that the goods in
question were not stolen goods) prevented conviction on a charge of
attempt to receive stolen property. Unless the defense of inherent
impossibility is liberally construed, subsection (b) may net more
defendants than was intended. For example, a man might be con-
victed of attempting to steal his own umbrella if he thought that it
belonged to someone else. It is suggested that although such a person
may indeed evidence a mind and conduct so socially dangerous as to
deserve liability, such an extension of the area of conduct prohibited
by criminal law should be made explicit, at least by reference to the
commentary of the draftsman, rather than merely implied by broad
statutory languageY1
Illinois, however, is not the only modern code to eliminate all legal
impossibilities as defenses. Louisiana provides that "it shall be
immaterial whether under the circumstances he would have actually
accomplished his purpose." 92 The Model Penal Code93 discards im-
possibility as a defense, but permits dismissal in extreme cases.9 ' The
latter code also makes guilty of an attempt any person who "pur-
posely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the
attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be" ;95 so, here
too, one could be convicted of attempting to steal his own property.
Conclusion
Some of the new Illinois Code provisions on inchoate crimes have
not changed pre-existing law, but have organized that law into a more
understandable code. Other provisions did change the law. Generally,
the drafters had to weigh two conflicting policies-the long-standing
rule that an intent alone cannot be punished, and the increasing
demand for crime prevention (as opposed to punishment). It seems
that the Illinois provisions, like other modern codes, have given
greater emphasis to the latter policy than has been given in the past.
the general rule that factual impossibility is no defense to attempt, held that
where the offense charged, whether grand or petit larceny, depends on the value
of the property attempted to be stolen, the fact that there was no such property
precludes a conviction for attempt.
90. 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906).
91. Attempting to do what is not a crime is not attempting to commit a
crime....
Theoretical discussions of the purpose of punishment and other problems
of penal philosophy are quite appropriate in legislative debate over proposed
changes in the law, but should not be employed to create a criminal attempt
out of what was not so at the time. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 494 (1957).
92. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27 (1950).
93. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
94. Id. at § 5.05.
95. Id. at § 5.01(1) (a).
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This is not to say that sacrifices of individual freedom should be
condoned in deference to the need for crime control in our more
complex society. Rather it is suggested that the changes will neces-
sarily give prosecutors a wider latitude to initiate proceedings against
inchoate offenders, but, at the same time, will retain for the courts
sufficient power to prevent infringement of individual freedoms.
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